Hybster - A Highly Parallelizable Protocol for Hybrid Fault-Tolerant Service Replication by Behl, Johannes et al.
Hybster
A Highly Parallelizable Protocol for Hybrid Fault-Tolerant Service Replication
Johannes Behl
TU Braunschweig
behl@ibr.cs.tu-bs.de
Tobias Distler
FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg
distler@cs.fau.de
Rüdiger Kapitza
TU Braunschweig
rrkapitz@ibr.cs.tu-bs.de
April 21st, 2017
v0.1
http://publikationsserver.tu-braunschweig.de/get/64440
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Notation 1
2.1 Modules and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.2 Module Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3 Additional Expressions and Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 System Model 8
3.1 Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4 Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5 Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4 Specification of Hybster 15
4.1 System Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Auxiliary Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2.1 Adaptive Timeouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.2 Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 TrInX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4 Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4.1 Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4.2 Replicas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5 Invocation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5.1 Client Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5.2 Replica Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.6 Ordering Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.7 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.8 Checkpointing Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.9 View-Change Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.10 State Transfer Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
http://publikationsserver.tu-braunschweig.de/get/64440
1 Introduction
Hybster is a replication protocol for providing fault-tolerant services based on the state-machine
approach [13]. It is designed for partially synchronous systems [9]. It does not rely on timing
assumptions to ensure safety but is only guaranteed to make progress in phases where unknown
upper bounds for message delivery and message processing exist. Moreover, using a hybrid
fault model in which some components are trusted to only fail by crashing even when other
components behave arbitrarily faulty [12, 14], Hybster requires only 2f + 1 service replicas to
tolerate up to f faulty ones.
While the original paper that introduces Hybster [3] mainly presents the rationale behind the
basic protocol and its parallelized variant, this technical report provides supplemental material
such as a comprehensive system model description and formal specification of the protocol. The
present document is the first version of the report that is planned to be updated once additional
parts are ready. All published versions will be accessible at [2].
2 Notation
The formal specification of Hybster is essentially based on I/O automata [11] as employed
by Castro and Liskov to specify the originator of Byzantine fault-tolerant service replication,
namely PBFT [5, 6, 8]. However, the model used here differs from I/O automata mainly in two
aspects. Firstly, it supports the direct interaction of modules where module instances explicitly
trigger operations on other module instances. This makes dependencies between modules more
apparent than the indirect interaction scheme based on operation signatures as used by the
original I/O automata. Moreover, it allows more flexible interaction patterns between modules,
especially helpful for describing the internal structure of complex processes. Secondly, to improve
readability, the notation used in this document is inspired by pseudo-code notations like [4].
2.1 Modules and Operations
The specification of Hybster is given as a set of modules encapsulating state and defining oper-
ations on that state. Compared to an I/O automaton, a module is a more abstract concept. A
module is not only a concurrent entity but allows for both asynchronous and synchronous oper-
ations. Furthermore, modules can be instantiated, there can be multiple identifiable instances
of one and the same module. Instances share the behavior as described by the operations of
the module but possess independent memory for state variables. Thus, modules and module
instances have strong similarities to classes and objects of the object-oriented programming
paradigm [1].
Tasks and Methods. Asynchronous operations are called tasks and are triggered according
to a specified precondition. If the precondition of a task is satisfied for a module instance, the
task of this instance is enabled and all enabled tasks are assumed to be executed asynchronously
at some time, in a nondeterministic order, although only one task at a time. Tasks are classified
as input, output, or internal operation. While tasks are not allowed to yield a direct return
value, output tasks may specify a list of output parameters that serve as inputs for other tasks.
Likewise, input tasks define a list of expected input parameters. Internal tasks can possess a
parameter list as well. These parameters are neither inputs nor outputs and their only purpose
is to make the function, the logical result of the internal tasks explicit.
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Synchronous operations, called methods, are directly executed when invoked and may return
a direct outcome. Methods are also classified as input, output, and internal operation but can be
additionally declared as public. A public method is permitted to alter the state of the invoked
module instance and yield a direct result; a public method can be regarded as both input and
output. Besides tasks and methods, global functions can be specified. Such operations are not
bound to instances of modules thus they cannot access any instance state.
Figure 1: Example for module definitions.
1 module NumberProducerp
2 upon init() do
3 outp ∈ (N)∗ := []
5 upon internal task produce(val ∈ N)
6 with
7 |outp| < 10
8 val = random(0, 100)
9 do
10 outp.append(val)
12 module NumberConsumerc
13 upon init() do
14 sumc ∈ N := 0
16 upon internal call consume(val ∈ N) do
17 sumc := sumc + val
Figure 1 gives an example for the definition of two modules. The module NumberProducer
generates random numbers within an internal task produce and NumberConsumer summarizes
numbers within an internal method consume. Both modules are not yet connected. How
they can interact is described in the next section. The freely chosen index p in “module
NumberProducerp” identifies an instance of the NumberProducer in the context of the module
definition. The special method init is used to initialize a newly created instance of a module.
“outp ∈ (N)∗ := []” in Line 3 defines a single variable out for a new instance of the module
NumberProducer denoted with p. outp is an instance (∈) of a list ((. . . )∗) of natural numbers
(N) that is initially assigned (:=) to an empty list ([]). The definition of the produce task starts
in Line 5. It is not allowed to have a direct return value. However, the parameter val is a free
variable that is eventually bound to the value produce generates. val cannot be used directly.
At this point, its only purpose is to make the function of produce, its logical outcome explicit.
The with keyword starts the precondition section of the task definition. produce is only enabled
when the list outp contains fewer then 10 elements. Since val is a free variable, binding val to
some randomly chosen natural number by “val = random(0, 100)” is always satisfied. In this
example, random is assumed to be a global function defined within some other module. When
a task is enabled, eventually all imperative statements in the section introduced by the keyword
do will be executed in the sequence as specified. produce comprises only a single statement.
“outp.append(val)” adds the value bound to the variable val to the end of the list referenced
by outp. In sum, produce appends randomly chosen numbers to the list outp as long as outp
currently contains fewer than 10 elements. The definition of NumberConsumer starting in
Line 12 uses c to refer to an instance of that module. Instances of NumberConsumer possess
one member variable sumc that is a natural number initialized with 0. Further they possess one
internal method consume that takes a value as argument and adds the value to sumc.
Operation Definition and Declaration. The complete syntax for the definition of opera-
tions can be found in Figure 2. The keyword upon begins the definition of a task or a method.
It is followed by an access modifier and an optional declaration of the operation type (task for
tasks and call for methods). Operations may define a list of parameters. In the case of output
and internal tasks, the parameters are output, in all other cases input parameters. Methods
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Figure 2: Syntax for operation definitions.
(a) Define tasks.
1 upon <internal|input|output> [task]
taskName(arg0 ∈ T0, . . . , argn−1 ∈ Tn−1)
2 asserts
3 // assertions
4 with
5 // preconditions
6 assert O() // included assertion
7 [if] P ()
8 do
9 // statements
10 yields
11 // postconditions
(b) Define methods and global functions.
1 upon <internal|input|output|public|global>
[call] methodName(arg0 ∈ T0, . . . )→ ret ∈ R
2 asserts
3 // assertions
4 do
5 // statements
6 return ret
7 yields
8 // postconditions
may additionally define a direct return parameter, although this is optional. Access modifier,
type declaration, name, and the list of all parameters form the signature of an operation. It
follows a number of sections that constitute the body of the operation definition. Assertions are
predicates that are expected to be true, they are assumptions that shall be made explicit. As-
sertions can be declared within the asserts section or anywhere else following an assert. A task
must specify a set of preconditions that determine when the task is enabled and thus eligible for
execution. Preconditions are given in the with section. Single preconditions can be prefaced by
an optional if and if multiple conditions are specified, they are implicitly combined by a logical
AND operation (∧). If an enabled task is executed or if a method is invoked, the sequence of
statements within the do section is evaluated. Unless the operation is a global function, state-
ments are allowed to modify the state of the invoked module instance. If a return statement is
reached, the evaluation of the operation ends. For methods with return parameter, the return
keyword has to be followed by an expression that specifies the return value. In conjunction with
or as replacement for statements that explicitly alter state or define the values of output and
return parameters, a set of postconditions may be declared that have to be satisfied after the
evaluation of an operation. Postconditions are located in the yields section.
Figure 3: Syntax for operation declarations.
(a) Declare tasks.
1 declare <internal|input|output> task
taskName(arg0 ∈ T0, . . . , argn−1 ∈ Tn−1)
(b) Declare methods and global functions.
1 declare <internal|input|output|public|global>
call methodName(arg0 ∈ T0, . . . )→ ret ∈ R
Operation definitions are both a declaration and a direct implementation. If just a type or
a part of an interface is to be given, the syntax shown in Figure 3 can be used to merely declare
operations. The implementation has to be provided by a different module.
2.2 Module Interaction
Modules are not only used to describe a single algorithm, they also serve as interacting compo-
nents in the specification of more complex systems. To describe various patterns of how modules
can interact, the modules NumberProducer and NumberConsumer defined in Figure 1 of the
previous section are extended in different ways. In contrast to the indirect interaction scheme
of I/O automata in which output operations of one automaton are linked to input operations
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Figure 4: Direct unidirectional module interaction.
(a) Source-linked.
1 module LinkingNumberSourcep
2 extends NumberProducer
4 upon init() do
5 snkp := NumberSink()
7 upon internal task transmit()
8 with
9 |outp| > 0
10 do
11 output snkp.receive(outp.dequeue())
13 module NumberSinkc
14 extends NumberConsumer
16 upon input call receive(val ∈ N) do
17 consume(val)
(b) Sink-linked.
1 module NumberSourcep
2 extends NumberProducer
4 upon output task transmit(val ∈ N)
5 with
6 |outp| > 0
7 do
8 val := outp.dequeue()
10 module LinkingNumberSinkc
11 extends NumberConsumer
13 upon init() do
14 srcc := NumberSource()
16 upon internal task receive(val ∈ N)
17 with input srcc.transmit(val) do
18 consume(val)
of other automata on the basis of the operations’ signature [11], in the model employed here,
instances of modules invoke operations of other instances directly.
Unidirectional Interaction. For example, Figure 4 shows two forms of a direct unidirec-
tional interaction. Generally, in an unidirectional interaction, the output of one module, the
source, is taken as input for another, the sink. Figure 4a presents the source-linked variant
of this interaction scheme. In this example, two modules are defined, LinkingNumberSource
and NumberSink. The module LinkingNumberSource is derived from the module Number-
Producer and the current instance of this module is referred to as p. LinkingNumberSource
inherits from NumberProducer the instance variable outp maintaining the list of generated
but not yet consumed random numbers and the internal task produce. Additionally, it defines
the instance variable snkp initialized with a new instance of the module NumberSink and an
internal task transmit. transmit is enabled when outp contains at least one generated num-
ber. Upon being executed, transmit removes the first value from the list outp (outp.dequeue())
and invokes the input method receive of the instance snkp with this value as argument. The
method invocation is synchronous, that is, all of its effects take place immediately. While
being optional, the preceding keyword output shall emphasize this particular interaction be-
tween LinkingNumberSource and NumberSink. The module NumberSink is derived from
NumberConsumer and thus inherits the variable sumc and the internal method consume, with
c denoting the current module instance. The input method receive of NumberSink simply
invokes consume of its base module handing over the given value val as argument. Taken all
together, the task produce defined by NumberProducer asynchronously generates random nat-
ural numbers and places them in the list outp as long as this list contains fewer than 10 values.
The task transmit asynchronously removes values from this list and delivers them as input to
the NumberSink instance snkp. The invoked input method receive of snkp calls the internal
method consume that finally adds the given value to the instance variable sumc, with c being
the internal reference of the module instance also referenced by snkp.
Taken a source-linked interaction, the source is bound to the type of the sink and the source
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instance needs a reference to the instance of the sink. In a sink-linked interaction scheme,
this relation is reversed. The example depicted in Figure 4b resembles the previous one. The
module NumberSource extends NumberProducer and defines the operation transmit whereas
the module LinkingNumberSink extendsNumberConsumer and defines the operation receive.
However, in this case, transmit is an output task that delivers the next random value from the
list outp by means of the output parameter val. The addressee of this value is not known to
the NumberSource module. Instead, instances of LinkingNumberSink maintain a reference
srcc to a NumberSource instance and their internal receive task is bound to srcc.transmit,
that is, receive is directly called after srcc.transmit has been executed. Analogous to the
output keyword, the input keyword emphasizing the interaction between NumberSource and
LinkingNumberSink may be omitted. While receiving operations in sink-linked interactions
are allowed to wait for multiple output events from different instances or even different output
operations, they must not specify additional preconditions that would prevent any of their
awaited outputs from being executed. In other words, sink-linked interactions must remain
input-enabled as required from I/O automata [11].
Bidirectional Interaction. Whereas unidirectional interaction schemes link outputs to in-
puts, method invocations are a form of bidirectional interaction in which a callee takes an input
and directly returns an output. Figure 5a presents an example. Again, NumberProducer and
NumberConsumer from Figure 1 are extended to create interacting modules. The resulting
modules IncreasingSum and Accumulator resemble the modules LinkingNumberSource and
NumberSink of the source-linked interaction example presented in Figure 4a. Opposed to the
input method receive of NumberSink, the public method add of Accumulator does not only
add the given value to the variable sumc but also returns the resulting sum as direct outcome
of the method invocation. To emphasize the invocation at the caller’s side, the keyword invoke
can be used.
Figure 5: Further module interaction schemes.
(a) Method invocation.
1 module IncreasingSump
2 extends NumberProducer
4 upon init() do
5 accp := Accumulator()
6 sump ∈ N := 0
8 upon internal task transmit()
9 with
10 |outp| > 0
11 do
12 sump := invoke accp.add(outp.dequeue())
14 module Accumulator(NumberConsumer)c
15 upon public call add(val ∈ N)→ sum ∈ N do
16 consume(val)
17 return sumc
(b) Global function.
1 module Computerc
2 upon global call thinkDeep()→ N do
3 return 42
5 module Beingb
6 upon init() do
7 answerb ∈ N ∪ {∅} := ∅
9 upon internal task askUltimate()
10 with
11 answerb = ∅
12 do
13 answerb := Computer::thinkDeep()
Global Functions. Global functions share the syntax with methods but are not bound to any
instance. While being specified within some module, they can be called from anywhere. Fig-
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ure 5b illustrates the usage. The function thinkDeep is defined within the module Computer and
simply returns 42 as constant. It is called by the module Being via “Computer::thinkDeep()”.
Stating the defining module explicitly is, however, optional.
Inner Modules. Another form of interaction that leads to a very tight coupling between
modules is the use of inner modules. An instance of an inner module possesses an implicit
reference to the module instance that creates it and has access to all instance variables and
operations be it internal or external of the referenced outer module instance. Figure 6 gives an
example. Instances of the module OuterNumberSource create an instance of the inner module
InnerNumberSink. The inner module instance thereby gets access to the list outc of produced
random numbers that OuterNumberSource inherits from NumberProducer. If outc contains
values, the internal task consumeInner of InnerNumberSink is enabled. When executed, the
inner instance removes a value from outc maintained in the outer instance and passes it as
argument to the consume method InnerNumberSink inherits from NumberConsumer.
Figure 6: Inner modules.
1 module OuterNumberSourcep
2 extends NumberProducer
4 upon init() do
5 snkp := OuterNumberSourcep::InnerNumberSink()
7 module OuterNumberSource::InnerNumberSinkc
8 extends NumberConsumer
10 upon internal task consumeInner(val ∈ N)
11 with
12 |outc| > 0
13 do
14 consume(outc.dequeue())
2.3 Additional Expressions and Types
While modules and their various ways of interaction are related to the general architecture of
a system, the purpose of operations is to specify concrete algorithms by declaring pre- and
postconditions or by defining them step-by-step as sequence of actions. This section gives an
overview of expressions and basic types used to form predicates and imperative statements for
the definition of operations.
Sets. Sets as unordered collections of objects are denoted by curly brackets. For example,
{1, 2, 3} defines the set of the natural numbers 1, 2, and 3. The empty set can be written as
{} or ∅. Concrete sets are instances of the basic type Set. X ∈ Set declares an arbitrary set
X, and X := {1, 2, 3} assigns the set {1, 2, 3} to it. Common set operations are determining
the union (∪) or the difference (\) of two sets. For example, X := X \ {2} ∪ {4} results in
X = {1, 3, 4}. The power set of some set Y is given by P(Y ). This can be used to specify a
typed set: Z ∈ P(N) declares Z as a set of natural numbers.
Tuples. The ordered counterparts of sets are tuples which are instances of the basic type
Tuple. Given n objects x0 to xn−1, the corresponding tuple is written as 〈x0, . . . , xn−1〉. For
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example, t ∈ Tuple := 〈1, 2, 3〉 defines t as the tuple comprising the elements 1, 2, and 3 in that
order. t could have been also declared as t ∈ N × N × N or t ∈ N3, additionally specifying the
types of the tuple’s elements.
Lists. While tuples are immutable, lists are ordered collections that can be modified. Lists are
instances of the basic type List that is also denoted by (. . . )∗. For example, a list l of natural
numbers can be declared with l ∈ (N)∗. Lists are given within square brackets. l := [1, 2, 3]
initializes l with the elements 1, 2, and 3. The size of l is |l| = 3. The type List defines the
methods append, pop, and dequeue. append adds an object to the end of the list, pop returns and
removes the last element and dequeue the first element. Taken the list l for example, l.append(4)
results in l = [1, 2, 3, 4], x := l.pop() in x = 3∧l = [1, 2], and x := l.dequeue() in x = 1∧l = [2, 3].
Booleans. Classical truth values are represented by the basic type Bool def≡ {True, False},
with True def≡ ∅ = ∅ and False def≡ ∅ 6= ∅. Based on that, a predicate can be defined as a method
or function returning a value of type Bool: upon [. . . ] call predicateName(. . . )→ Bool. An
alternative notation for True is > and for False ⊥.
Ellipses. Predicates may take several input parameters. Sometimes it is sufficient to verify
that a predicate holds for a subset of these parameters in conjunction with any binding of the
remaining ones. For example, given a ternary predicate P and two particular arguments x and y,
the question could be if P is fulfilled for x and y and any additional argument z. To simplify the
resulting expression ∃zP (x, y, z), the elliptic form P (x, y, ·) can be used. The extended variant
for multiple arbitrarily chosen input parameters is written as P (x, . . . ) def≡ ∃y∃zP (x, y, z).
None. At some occasions it can be helpful to bind a variable to a special value that resides
outside the main domain of that variable, for instance, to denote that the variable is unset and
does not contain any real value. As such special value None may be used, also denoted by ∅.
With x ∈ N ∪ {∅}, the variable x can reference a natural number or the special value ∅.
In addition to basic types, specifications can make use of common control flow structures such
as conditionals and loops but also of more specific structures with regard to asynchronous
operations.
Sequences of Statements. Sequences of statements are usually given as list, each statement
in a single line at the same level of indentation. Figure 7a shows an example in which the values
of two variables x and y are swapped using an additional variable tmp. An alternative notation
of this example where statements are written in a single line separated by semicolons is given
in Figure 7b. If single statements are wrapped, be it for clarity or because they do not fit into
the space for a single line, overhanging parts have to be indented by two levels. As Figure 7c
illustrates, this can happen within a single line or by splitting the statement such that it spans
multiple lines.
Conditionals and Loops. The notation also supports typical control flow statements for
conditional branches or repetitive executions. Figure 8a gives an example in which two variable
x and y are compared and a return value is chosen depending on the outcome of this comparison.
If a condition is satisfied, the associated block indented by one level is executed. Although these
7
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Figure 7: Sequences of statements.
(a) Multiple lines.
1 tmp := x
2 x := y
3 y := tmp
(b) Single line.
1 tmp := x;x := y; y := tmp
(c) Long lines.
1 lx := "This is a long expression
written in a single line."
2 ly := "And this is another long
3 expression but written
4 using multiple lines."
blocks contain only a single return in this example, blocks can generally span an arbitrary
number of statements. An example for a loop that iterates over all elements of a set X and
passes them to a procedure processX is depicted in Figure 8b.
Figure 8: Control flow statements.
(a) Conditionals.
1 if x < y then
2 return x
3 else if y < x then
4 return y
5 else
6 return 0
(b) Loops.
1 for all x ∈ X do
2 processX(x)
Synchronous Task Evaluations. As described in Section 2.1, tasks are enabled when their
specified precondition is satisfied but they are only executed asynchronously without any guar-
anteed order. Furthermore, if the precondition of a task t depends on state that is altered by
other tasks such that t is enabled and disabled depending on which other tasks are executed,
there is no guarantee that the task t is executed at all. To support occasions in which a task
is to be executed synchronously if necessary, the check keyword is provided. For example,
if “check someTask()” is called, the precondition of task someTask is evaluated and, if the
precondition is satisfied, someTask is executed like a synchronous operation. Thus, the task is
transformed into a conditional method invocation.
3 System Model
The system model Hybster is based on is similar to the one used by PBFT [5, p. 26ff.]. Briefly,
in a partially synchronous system with unreliable network, clients invoke operations of a stateful
service that is replicated across several servers called replicas in order to ensure that the service
does not return incorrect results even if a bounded number of these replicas behaves arbitrarily
faulty. As the most notable difference to PBFT, however, Hybster also assumes that processes
can be equipped with subsystems that are more reliable than other components such that these
subsystems never fail in an arbitrary manner but only by crashing. Assuming such trusted
subsystems, Hybster requires fewer replicas than PBFT to tolerate the same number of faults.
A more detailed description of Hybster’s system model is given in the following.
3.1 Processes
Hybster is designed for a distributed system in which processes communicate exclusively via
message passing over a shared network. Two types of processes are distinguished, replicas and
8
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clients. A set of replicas, also called replica group, provides a replicated realization of a service,
with each replica hosting an instance of an implementation of that service. Clients invoke
operations of the service by means of a local invocation handler instance encapsulating the
communication with the replicas. The set of replicas in the system {r0, r1, . . . , rn−1} is denoted
by R and the number of replicas by n, that is, n def≡ |R|. Analogously, the set and numbers of
clients is given by C def≡ {c0, c1, . . . , cnclients−1} and nclients def≡ |C|.
Listing 1: Specification of a deterministic stateful service implementation.
1 module Services
3 upon init() do
4 states ∈ S := s0
6 upon public call invoke(c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svccmd ∈ O)→ O′ do
7 s′, svcret := calculateResult(states, c, invno, svccmd)
8 states := s′
9 return svcret
11 declare internal call calculateResult(s ∈ S, c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svccmd ∈ O)→ S ×O′
13 upon output call createStateSnapshot()→ S do
14 return states
16 upon input call installStateSnapshot(s ∈ S) do
17 states := s
The replicated service is assumed to be stateful and its implementation realized as a de-
terministic state machine. That is, starting from the same state und provided with the same
command as input, the service implementation, if correct, always yields the same result indepen-
dent of the instance and independent of the replica that executes it. Listing 1 shows the detailed
specification of the service implementation. All possible states of the service’s deterministic state
machine are represented in the set S. Each instance of the type Service starts in the same initial
state s0 ∈ S that is assigned to the instance variable states. The main interface of a service
instance is its public invoke method. invoke expects a service command svccmd of the type O
that encapsulates the invoked service operation together with all required arguments. Moreover,
invoke has to be provided with the identifier c ∈ C of the client that issued the command and
a sequence number invno assigned by the client to identify the particular invocation. To dis-
tinguish different types of sequence numbers, invocation numbers are of the type iN def≡ N. The
method invoke does not implement the state transition itself. For that purpose, it relies on the
internal method calculateResult that deterministically maps a specified current state and the
invocation information comprising the client, its invocation number, and the service command
to a new state and a return value of the type O′. Being dependent of the concrete service, the
method calculateResult is not implemented but only declared. invoke calls calculateResult on
the basis of the state referred to by the instance variable states. When the call returns, it sets
states to the new state and returns with the return value calculated by the command execution.
Besides the main method for invoking operations of the realized service, the type Service offers
methods to create and install snapshots of the service state.
The interface of the invocation handler that is used by clients to issue commands to the
replicated service is depicted in Listing 2. The method startInvocation takes a service command
9
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Listing 2: Specification of the invocation handler interface.
1 module InvocationHandlerc
2 declare input call startInvocation(svccmd ∈ O)
3 declare output task invocationCompleted(svcret ∈ O′)
of the type O as input. The respective return value of the command execution is eventually
delivered by the output task invocationCompleted. Correct clients are only allowed to start a
new invocation when a previous invocation was completed, that is, when no other invocation is
in progress.
3.2 Time
The system is assumed to be partially synchronous [9]. More precisely, it is assumed that there
exist upper bounds for the delivery of messages and how long it takes a process to carry out
particular operations but that these upper bounds are not known a priori.
Listing 3: Specification of timers with individual clock speeds.
1 module Timers
3 upon init() do
4 timeouts ∈ N ∪ {∅} := ∅
6 upon input call schedule(timeout ∈ N) do
7 timeouts := timeout
9 upon internal task tick()
10 with
11 timeouts 6= ∅ ∧ timeouts > 0
12 do
13 timeouts := timeouts − 1
15 upon output task timerExpired()
16 with
17 timeouts 6= ∅ ∧ timeouts = 0
18 do
19 timeouts := ∅
21 upon output call isScheduled()→ Bool do
22 return timeouts 6= ∅
24 upon input call cancel() do
25 timeouts := ∅
In this model, processes have access to local timers that advance at individual speeds. An
upper bound for the relative speeds exists but is unknown. Listing 3 presents the specification of
a type Timer that can signal when a configured amount of time that is relative to each Timer
instance elapsed. For that purpose, each instance maintains a variable timeouts that stores
the remaining number of clock ticks until the timer expires or None if no timeout is currently
configured. The input method schedule can be used to start the timer. It sets timeouts to the
specified number of clock ticks. The internal task tick regularly decrements the current value
of timeouts by one as long as timeouts is greater then zero. Though, it depends on the relative
10
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speed of the timer instance in which interval the task is executed. Once the value of timeouts
reaches zero, the output task timerExpired signals that the previously configured number of
ticks has elapsed. In addition to the basic functionality, the type Timer defines methods to
determine if a timeout is currently configured and to stop the timer before timerExpired is
triggered.
3.3 Communication
The network used by processes to communicate with each other by sending messages can be
unreliable. It is allowed to reorder, duplicate, delay, and even drop messages. As a consequence,
the assumed upper bound for message delivery only holds if a message is sent sufficiently often.
Since the upper bound is not known a priori, it is not known in advance how often this is.
The specification of the network and its conditions can be found in Listing 4. Messages
(Listing 4a) are modeled as tuples that contain at least one element identifying the message
type. A message of the type Msg can be written as 〈Msg, [. . . ]〉, where [. . .] is a placeholder
for a list of optional elements. From the network’s perspective, processes act as sinks that
receive any kind of message (Listing 4b). The specification of the network itself (Listing 4c) is
based on the one given by Castro [5, p. 28]. The state of a network comprises the set of all
connected processes stored in nodesn and the set wiren that maintains a pair for all messages
that are currently in transmission. The first element of such a pair is the message in question
and the second is a set of processes supposed to receive the message. To request the network
to transmit a message m, the input method send is provided. It takes m as argument together
with a subset R of the connected processes and notes R in wiren as intended recipients for m.
Delivering messages is the responsibility of the internal task transmit. It removes a recipient r
of an existing pair 〈m,R〉 in wiren and invokes the receive method of r passing m as argument.
If no recipient for a message m is left, the pair for m in wiren can be cleaned up by the internal
task discard. However, as long as the pair for a message m is contained in wiren, it is possible
that the set of recipients is altered by the task misbehave. Modeling the unreliable behavior
of the network, misbehave can add processes to or remove processes from the current set of
intended recipients for m. This includes adding new recipients to an empty set or removing all
recipients. The only constraint at this point is that the task is fair, that it does not have any
bias towards particular messages. The likelihood for being altered has to be the same for all
pairs in wiren to ensure that messages sent infinitely often are also delivered infinitely often
and that messages sent finitely often are also delivered finitely often. Note that the network as
specified here does not invent completely new messages, which includes that it does not corrupt
sent messages. This is actually more restrictive than necessary. All messages in Hybster are
authenticated (see below), which ensures their integrity at the protocol level even if the network
could deliver corrupted messages.
3.4 Cryptography
Hybster relies on digital signatures and message authentication codes (MACs) to authenticate
messages exchanged over the network. Moreover, cryptographic hash functions are used to
reduce the amount of transmitted data.
The authenticity of messages is documented by message certificates (Listing 5a). Message
certificates are messages themselves, they are tuples comprising a certificate type, a proof of
their validity, and further elements if required. Usually, they are directly attached to the mes-
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Listing 4: Specification of the communication system shared by all processes.
(a)
1 module Message
2 extends Tuple〈MessageType, . . .〉
4 declare output method type()→MessageType
(b)
1 module MessageSink
2 declare input call receive(m ∈Message)
(c)
1 module Networkn
3 upon init() do
4 nodesn ∈ P(MessageSink) := set of all connected processes
5 wiren ∈ P(Message× P(MessageSink)) := {}
7 upon input call send(m ∈Message,R ∈ P(MessageSink))
8 asserts
9 R ⊆ nodesn
10 do
11 if 〈m,R∗〉 ∈ wiren then
12 wiren := wiren \ {〈m,R∗〉} ∪ {〈m,R∗ ∪R〉}
13 else
14 wiren := wiren ∪ {〈m,R〉}
16 upon internal task transmit(m ∈Message, r ∈MessageSink)
17 with
18 ∃〈m,R〉 ∈ wiren : r ∈ R
19 do
20 wiren := wiren \ {〈m,R〉} ∪ {〈m,R \ {r}〉}
21 output r.receive(m)
23 upon internal task discard(m ∈Message)
24 with
25 ∃〈m, ∅〉 ∈ wiren
26 do
27 wiren := wiren \ {〈m, ∅〉}
29 upon internal task misbehave(m ∈Message,R ∈ P(MessageSink), R′ ∈ P(MessageSink))
30 with
31 ∃〈m,R〉 ∈ wiren
32 R′ ⊆ nodesn
33 do
34 wiren := wiren \ {〈m,R〉} ∪ {〈m,R′〉}
sage they certify forming a certified message (Listing 5b). The notation for such a message is
〈 . . .〉[certificate], with [certificate] being a placeholder for an identifier of the employed certi-
fication method. 〈 . . .〉σx denotes a message signed by a process x. If a message is certified by a
MAC, it is written as 〈 . . .〉µx,y,z , where the underlying secret key is shared among the processes
x, y, and z. If a process x issues an array of MACs, a so-called authenticator [7] for the processes
y and z, the message is annotated with 〈 . . .〉αx:y,z .
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Listing 5: Specification of certified messages.
(a)
1 module MessageCertificate
2 extends Message
4 declare output method proof()→ Proof
(b)
1 module CertifiedMessage
2 extends Message
4 declare output method certificate()→MessageCertificate
Listings 6a and 6b depict the specifications for providers of signatures and MACs, respec-
tively. An instance of the type SignatureProvider is initialized with a public/private key pair.
It issues digital signatures on the basis of this pair in the method createSignature and veri-
fies signatures in verifySignatures using the public key connected to the signature in question.
Message authentication codes are issued byMacProvider instances. MACs are created and ver-
ified in the methods createMac and verifyMac using the shared key that is configured during
the initialization of the instance.
The implementation of a cryptographic hash function is provided by the typeDigestProvider
as shown in Listing 6c. This type offers a global method digest that returns the hash calculated
for a given argument in form of a message similar to the certificates issued by certification
providers described above. The hash function is required to be collision resistant such that
∀m,m′ : digest(m) = digest(m′) ↔ m = m′ holds with almost absolute certainty during the
period in which the message m is relevant and not outdated from perspective of the protocol.
3.5 Faults
Constraints. A process, be it a replica or a client, can fail at any point in time. The behavior
of a failed process is undetermined, it can stop the processing of messages completely or it can
start to act maliciously by sending messages that are not correct with regard to the protocol
specification. Thus, processes can fail arbitrarily, that is, they can be Byzantine. However, this
does not apply to all components of replicas. Part of each replica is a trusted subsystem that is
assumed to fail only by crashing. That is, independent of the rest of the process, it is assumed
that a trusted subsystem either behaves according to the specification or does not carry out
any operation, it is assumed that a trusted subsystem never yields a result that is incorrect.
Nonetheless, a process is still regarded as either correct or faulty. If some of the components of
a process are faulty in any way, the whole process is deemed as faulty.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the cryptographic assumptions hold under all circumstances.
Even if an adversary controlled all faulty processes in the system, it is assumed that the col-
laborating processes would not be able to impersonate correct processes or find collisions for
message hashes. Therefore, adversaries are regarded as computationally restricted.
Given a point t in the time T of some execution of the system, Rf (t) denotes the set of all
replicas that are faulty at t and Cf (t) the set of all faulty clients. The recovery of processes is
not considered. Therefore, it holds: ∀t, t′ ∈ T : t ≤ t′ → (Rf (t) ∪ Cf (t)) ⊆ (Rf (t′) ∪ Cf (t′)).
Further, if a replica or a client is said to be faulty without a reference to time, there is some
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Listing 6: Specification of providers for message certificates and cryptographic hashes.
(a)
1 module SignatureProviders
3 upon init(pubkey ∈ PublicKey, privkey ∈ PrivateKey) do
4 pubkeys := pubkey
5 privkeys := privkey
7 upon output call createSignature(m)→MessageCertificate do
8 p := signature for m using privkeys
9 return 〈Signature, pubkeys, p〉
11 upon output call verifySignature(〈Signature, pubkey, p〉,m)→ Bool do
12 return use pubkey to verify that p is a valid signature for m
(b)
1 module MacProviders
3 upon init(key ∈ SharedKey) do
4 keys := key
6 upon output call createMac(m)→MessageCertificate do
7 p := calcMac(m)
8 return 〈Mac, p〉
10 upon output call verifyMac(〈Mac, p〉,m)→ Bool do
11 return p = calcMac(m)
13 upon internal call calcMac(m)→Mac do
14 return MAC for m using keys
(c)
1 module DigestProvider
3 upon global call digest(m)→Message
4 d := calculate digest of m
5 return 〈Digest, d〉
time in the execution in question in which it does not behave according to the specification.
As a consequence, the set of faulty replicas is given by Rf def≡
⋃
t∈T Rf (t) and the set of faulty
clients by Cf def≡
⋃
t∈T Cf (t). It is assumed that the number of faulty replicas does not exceed a
particular f , thus it is assumed that |Rf | ≤ f < n is always true. Opposed to that, there is no
required upper bound for the number of faulty clients, that is, |Cf | ≤ nclients. Complementing
the sets of faulty processes, the sets for correct replicas and clients are defined as Rc def≡ R \Rf
and Cc def≡ C \ Cf , respectively.
Quorums. Since processes can fail silently or omit to send messages and since the assumed
upper bounds for message delivery and processing times are not known, a correct process cannot
know if an expected message from another process p has not arrived yet because p is faulty or
because the network or p are slower than currently assumed. Hence, in situations where messages
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are not received in time, processes cannot determine if another process p is faulty or not. Even
if p provides a correct message in time, it can be Byzantine or fail at a later point in time. As a
consequence, state-machine replication protocols do not rely on single replicas to acknowledge
protocol information or states but on sufficiently large subsets of the replica group, so-called
quorums [7]. Formally, a quorum is defined as a set Q such that Q ⊆ R ∧ |Q| ≥ qs, with
qs being a minimum quorum size that depends on the properties the particular quorum shall
provide. The most important quorums are called intersecting quorums. If not stated otherwise,
these quorums have the fixed minimum size q and fulfill the properties that (1) there is at
least one, possibly faulty, replica in the intersection of every two quorums (2q > n) and (2) the
number of correct replicas in the system suffices to form a quorum (n ≥ q + f). An important
implication of these properties is that each intersecting quorum contains at least one correct
replica (q > f). Given a number of replica faults f that has to be tolerated, these properties
lead to a minimum configuration of n = 2f + 1 required replicas with a minimum size for
intersecting quorums of q = f + 1. Another type of quorums are acknowledging quorums, also
called weak quorums. These quorums have the property that at least one correct replica is
contained. Thus, their minimum size is always f + 1, independent of the number of replicas n.
Further, in the minimum configuration they have the same size as intersecting quorums.
4 Specification of Hybster
This section describes the properties Hybster provides and presents a formal specification of the
protocol. An informal step-by-step description will be part of a future version of this document.
4.1 System Properties
Hybster provides roughly the same properties as PBFT [5], which is a form of linearizability [10]
that takes the arbitrary behavior of Byzantine clients into account. From the perspective of
each correct client, the replicated system appears to execute all invocations sequentially in an
order that respects the real-time relation between the invocations.
The specification of the properties Hybster satisfies is presented in Listing 7 and is based
on the one given by Castro [5, p. 30]. It uses the service and invocation handler specifications
introduced in Section 3.1.
Initialization. First, a couple of system-wide variables are initialized (init()s). svcs takes an
instance of the service implementation. The set of issued but yet unprocessed invocations is
maintained in pendings and all undelivered responses in responsess. Invocations are triples of
a client (C), an invocation number (iN), and a service command (O), thus I def≡ C × iN × O.
Invocation numbers are individual to each client and correct clients assign these numbers only
once and monotonically increasing. Therefore, invocations can be identified by the pair of a
client and an invocation number (C× iN). A response to an invocation is formed by its identifier
and the value returned by its execution (O′), that is, Y def≡ C×iN×O′. Moreover, the system-wide
variable last_invs references a vector that stores for each client the invocation number of the
last executed invocation. All entries of this vector are initialized with zero and the first valid
invocation number for each client is one.
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Listing 7: Specification of linearizability with Byzantine clients.
1 module ByzantineLinearizabilitys
2 extends InvocationHandler as c
4 upon init()s do
5 svcs := Service()
6 pendings ∈ P(I) := {}
7 responsess ∈ P(Y) := {}
8 last_invss : C → iN, for all c ∈ C do last_invss(c) := 0
10 upon init()c do
11 invnoc ∈ iN := 0
12 svccmdc ∈ O ∪ {∅} := ∅
13 isfaultyc ∈ Bool := False
15 upon input call startInvocation(svccmd ∈ O)c
16 asserts
17 svccmdc = ∅
18 do
19 invnoc := invnoc + 1
20 svccmdc := svccmd
21 registerInvocation(〈c, invnoc, svccmd〉)
23 upon internal call registerInvocation(inv′ = 〈c ∈ C, . . .〉)s do
24 pendings := pendings \ {inv ∈ pendings | inv = 〈c, . . .〉} ∪ {inv′}
26 upon internal task processInvocation(inv = 〈c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svccmd ∈ O〉)s
27 with
28 inv ∈ pendings ∧ invno > last_invss(c) ∧ preservesFairness(inv)
29 do
30 pendings := pendings \ {inv}
31 svcret := invoke svcs.invoke(c, invno, svccmd)
32 responsess := responsess \ {resp ∈ responsess | resp = 〈c, . . .〉} ∪ {〈c, invno, svcret〉}
33 last_invss(c) := invno
35 declare internal call preservesFairness(inv = 〈c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svccmd ∈ O〉)s
37 upon output task invocationCompleted(svcret ∈ O′)c
38 with
39 isfaultyc ∨ resp = 〈c, invnoc, svcret〉 ∈ responsess
40 do
41 responsess := responsess \ {resp}
42 svccmdc := ∅
44 upon internal task clientFailureOccured()c
45 with
46 ¬isfaultyc
47 do
48 isfaultyc := True
50 upon internal task injectFaultyInvocation(c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svccmd ∈ O)c
51 with
52 isfaultyc
53 do
54 registerInvocation(〈c, invno, svccmd〉)
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Invocation. Invocation handler instances are dedicated to single clients and used by them to
invoke operations of the replicated service. A handler instance maintains three variables (see
init()c), the invocation number of the last invocation invnoc, svccmdc that stores the service
command of a currently running but not yet completed invocation or ∅ if no invocation is
in progress, and the flag isfaultyc that marks faulty clients. Correct clients start only one
invocation at a time and wait for its completion before they start a new one. Hence, the input
method startInvocation expects that svccmdc is ∅ when it is called. Subsequently, it assigns
the next invocation number to the passed service command, sets svccmdc to mark the invocation
as in progress, and submits the new invocation by calling registerInvocation. This system-wide
method adds invocations to the set of pending invocations while ensuring that each client has
at most one outstanding invocation in that set.
Processing. Pending invocations are delivered to the service instance by the task process-
Invocation, one invocation at a time. It considers only invocations with numbers higher than
the numbers stored in last_invs, that is, with numbers higher than the one of the last invocation
that was executed for the respective client. Being always the case for correct clients, this prevents
faulty clients from injecting invocations in a non-increasing order. Further, processInvocation
makes use of the method preservesFairness to select the invocation to be executed next. This
auxiliary method is only declared and documents the requirement that the selection mechanism
is unbiased and does not give particular clients an advantage. Once an invocation has been
chosen, it is removed from the pending set and handed over to the service implementation. The
value returned by the service is used to create a response. Before this response is added to the set
of undelivered responses, older responses for the client are removed if necessary. A faulty client
could have sent a new invocation without collecting the response for a previous one. Finally,
last_invs is updated to mark the current invocation as executed.
Completion. Adhering to the interface specified by the type InvocationHandler, invocations
are delivered to clients through the output task invocationCompleted. Provided that a client c
is not marked as faulty, this task removes a response belonging to c from the set of undelivered
responses and marks the invocation as completed by setting svccmdc to None before it delivers
the return value.
Faulty Clients. A client c can fail at any point in time. This is modeled by the task
clientFailureOccured. If executed, it simply sets the flag isfaultyc to True. From that time
on, the client c can circumvent the regular startInvocation method and can issue arbitrary
invocation as realized by the task injectFaultyInvocation. However, it can still only do so for
invocations that are attributed to c itself. As stated in Section 3.5, the system model assumes
that even arbitrarily behaving clients are not able to impersonate correct clients. In addition
to the injection of arbitrary invocation, a faulty client can locally deliver any return value as
reflected in the task invocationCompleted.
4.2 Auxiliary Modules
The specifications of Hybster’s main protocols make use of two mechanisms that help to cope
with the partially synchronous environment and the unreliable network as assumed by the system
model (Section 3): adaptive timeouts and retransmitting connections. The respective modules
realizing these mechanisms are presented in the following.
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4.2.1 Adaptive Timeouts
The time model Hybster’s specification is based on assumes upper bounds for message delivery
and processing times, upper bounds, however, that are unknown (cf. Section 3.2). As a conse-
quence, it cannot be known how long certain protocol actions need to finish. Nonetheless, it is
known that they do not require an infinite amount of time as long as their completion does not
depend on a faulty process. Therefore, provided that some protocol action can be retried in-
finitely often, it is possible to approach the upper bound by increasing the value for the timeout
that determines when the action is regarded as failed.
Listing 8: Specification of timeouts adaptive to unknown upper bounds for delays.
1 module AdaptiveTimeouts
3 upon init(procs ∈ Set) do
4 procss := procs
5 timers := T imer()
6 delay_deltas ∈ N := increment if timeout expired
7 delays ∈ N := delay_deltas
8 expireds ∈ Bool := False
10 upon input call start(x)
11 asserts
12 x ∈ procss // x could be used in more sophisticated implementations
13 do
14 adapt()
15 output timers.schedule(delays)
17 upon input call adapt() do
18 if expireds then
19 delays := delays + delay_deltas
20 expireds := False
22 upon input call stop() do
23 output timers.cancel()
24 expireds := False
26 upon internal task timerExpired()
27 with
28 input timers.timerExpired()
29 do
30 expireds := True
32 upon output call isExpired()→ Bool do
33 return expireds
35 upon output call isRunning()→ Bool do
36 return input timers.isScheduled()
This mechanism is realized in the module AdaptiveT imeout shown in Listing 8. It is intended
that one instance of this module is used for one particular protocol action that has to be carried
out by one process from a group of processes. For example, if a replica is supposed to provide
a particular message, an instance of this module can be used to signal when this step in the
protocol is considered as failed. If this is the case, the step is repeated, but this time, a different
replica is chosen to provide the message and it is given more time to do so. Eventually, this
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step will complete successfully, at the latest when a correct replica is selected and the currently
configured timeout exceeded the upper bound for providing the expected message.
Although the implementation of AdaptiveT imeout is tailored to the time model stated above,
please note that AdaptiveT imeout in fact abstracts from the concrete model. Currently, it in-
creases the timeout value linearly. If a time model as in PBFT were used in which a delay
function delay(t) does not grow faster than the time t [5], an exponential increase could com-
pensate for that. More sophisticated strategies would be required if the time bounds were only
assumed to hold long enough such that the system is able to make progress [9]. Still, higher-level
protocols could rely on the abstraction provided by AdaptiveT imeout.
The module AdaptiveT imeout in detail: Each instance maintains a reference to a timer
instance, the current timeout value stored in delays and initialized with a configured constant
delay_deltas, and a flag expireds set when the timeout expired. The instance also gets the set of
processes that are within the considered group. This set is actually not required by the presented
implementation and is only provided to allow for other strategies that adjust the timeout value
for processes individually instead of globally for all processes. The timeout is started through the
input method start. It takes the process as argument that is currently expected to carry out the
monitored action. Again, the presented implementation does not make use of this information.
Upon being invoked, the method start configures the timer to signal after time delays. Prior to
that, it is checked if the current timeout value delays needs to be adjusted. The strategy for that
is realized by the input method adapt. If the timer was marked as expired, it adds delay_deltas
to delays and resets the expired flag. If the timed protocol action completed or if the timeout is
not needed anymore, the input method stop can be invoked canceling a currently running timer.
Otherwise, the timer will eventually expire, monitored with the internal timerExpired task.
This sets the expired flag which can be queried by the output method isExpired. Additionally,
isRunning returns if the timer is currently scheduled or not.
4.2.2 Connections
Even if a process expected to provide some message were correct and even if other processes
waited actually long enough to receive this message, the message might not come in time since
the network could have dropped it. The upper bounds for message delivery only hold if the
message is sent sufficiently, virtually infinitely often (see Section 3.3).
Retransmitting messages is the responsibility of the Connection module presented in List-
ing 9. It sends registered messages over and over again until they are explicitly removed from the
connection by a higher-level protocol. An instance of the Connection module expects a set of
recipients when constructed. It further has a reference to the network and keeps with outs a set
of all messages that are currently in transmission. Messages are handed over to the connection
via the send input method which adds the message to outs. The internal task retransmit is
enabled as long as some message is contained in outs. When executed, it picks one message
and (re-)sends it to the configured recipients. Nevertheless, the selected message remains in the
set outs and could be chosen again in a later execution of the task. If multiple messages are
contained in outs, the selection mechanism is supposed to be fair, on average all messages are
retransmitted at the same rate. The module offers multiple variants of the method remove used
to deregister messages from the connection. remove can be invoked with a single message, a set
of messages, or a predicate that determines which messages are to be removed from outs.
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Listing 9: Specification of a retransmitting connection masking message loss.
1 module Connections
3 upon init(recipients ∈ P(MessageSink)) do
4 nets ∈ Network := reference to the network
5 recipientss := recipients
6 outs ∈ P(Message) := {}
8 upon input call send(m ∈Message) do
9 outs := outs ∪ {m}
11 upon internal task retransmit(m ∈Message)
12 with
13 m ∈ outs
14 do
15 output nets.send(m, recipientss)
17 upon input call remove(m ∈Message) do
18 outs := outs \ {m}
20 upon input call remove(M ∈ P(Message)) do
21 outs := outs \M
23 upon input call remove(P : Message→ Bool) do
24 outs := outs \ {m ∈ outs | P (m)}
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4.3 TrInX
Listing 10: Specification of the trusted subsystem TrInX.
1 module TrInXs
3 upon init(id ∈ TssID, ctrtypes ∈ Set, key ∈ SharedKey) do
4 insts := id
5 ctrtypess := ctrtypes
6 macprovs :=MacProvider(key)
7 ctrss : ctrtypes→ N, for all tc ∈ ctrtypes do ctrss(tc) := 0
9 upon public call createContinuingCertificate(tc, tv′ ∈ N,m)→MessageCertificate
10 asserts
11 tc ∈ ctrtypess ∧ tv′ ≥ ctrss(tc)
12 do
13 tv := ctrss(tc)
14 p := macprovs.createMac(insts‖tc‖tv′‖tv‖m)
15 ctrss(tc) := tv′
16 return 〈TCtr, insts, tc, tv′, tv, p〉
18 upon public call createIndependentCertificate(tc, tv′ ∈ N,m)→MessageCertificate
19 asserts
20 tc ∈ ctrtypess ∧ tv′ > ctrss(tc)
21 do
22 p := macprovs.createMac(insts‖tc‖tv′‖ − ‖m)
23 ctrss(tc) := tv′
24 return 〈TCtr, insts, tc, tv′,−, p〉
26 upon output call verifyCertificate(〈TCtr, inst, tc, tv′, tv, p〉,m)→ Bool do
27 return macprovs.verifyMac(inst‖tc‖tv′‖tv‖m)
29 upon input call forwardCounter(tc, tv′ ∈ N)
30 asserts
31 tc ∈ ctrtypess ∧ tv′ ≥ ctrss(tc)
32 do
33 ctrss(tc) := tv′
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4.4 Processes
4.4.1 Clients
Listing 11: Specification of invocation handlers dedicated to a client.
1 module ByzInvocationHandlerc
2 extends InvocationHandler
3 extends MessageSink
5 upon init(pubkey ∈ PublicKey, privkey ∈ PrivateKey, pubkeys : R→ PublicKey) do
6 repconnsc : R → Connection, for all r ∈ R do repconnsc(r) := Connection({r})
7 repgrpconnc := Connection(R)
8 sigprovc := SignatureProvider(pubkey, privkey)
9 pubkeysc := pubkeys
10 imc := InvocationHandlerc::Invocation()
12 upon input call startInvocation(svccmd ∈ O) do
13 output imc.startInvocation(svccmd)
15 upon output task invocationCompleted(svcret ∈ O′) with
16 input imc.invocationCompleted(svcret)
18 upon input call receive(m ∈Message) do
19 output imc.receive(m)
21 upon internal call hasV alidCertificate(m = 〈 . . .〉σr )→ Bool do
22 p := m.certificate().proof()
23 return input sigprovc.verifySignature(〈Signature, pubkeysc(r), p〉,m)
4.4.2 Replicas
Listing 12: Specification of the current view status used by protocol modules.
1 module ViewStatuss
3 upon init(replica ∈ R) do
4 replicas ∈ R := replica
5 v_stabs ∈ vN := 0
6 v_curs ∈ vN := v_stabs
8 upon global call leader(v ∈ vN)→R do
9 return rv mod n
11 upon input call leaveV iewFor(v′ ∈ vN)
12 asserts
13 v_curr < v′
14 do
15 v_curr := v′
17 upon input call enterV iew(v′ ∈ vN)
18 asserts
19 v_stabr < v′ ≤ v_curr
20 do
21 v_stabr := v′
23 upon output call latestLeader()→R do
24 return leader(v_stabs)
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26 upon output call isInStableV iew()→ Bool do
27 return v_curs = v_stabs
29 upon output call isStableLeader()→ Bool do
30 return isInStableV iew() ∧ replicas = lastestLeader()
32 upon output call isStableFollower()→ Bool do
33 return isInStableV iew() ∧ replicas 6= lastestLeader()
35 upon output call stableV iew()→ vN do
36 return v_stabs
38 upon output call currentV iew()→ vN do
39 return v_curs
Listing 13: Specification of a replica making use of multiple protocol modules.
1 module Replicar
2 extends MessageSink
4 def T C def≡ {M,O,N}
6 upon init(pubkey ∈ PublicKey, privkey ∈ PrivateKey,
tsskey ∈ SharedKey, pubkeys : R∪ C → PublicKey, tssinsts : R→ TssID) do
7 repconnsr : R \ {r} → Connection, for all r ∈ R \ {r} do repconnsr(r) := Connection({r})
8 repgrpconnr := Connection(R \ {r})
9 tssr := TrInX(tssinsts(r), T C, tsskey)
10 tssinstsr := tssinsts
11 sigprovr := SignatureProvider(pubkey, privkey)
12 pubkeysr := pubkeys
13 cmr := Replicar::Client
14 omr := Replicar::Ordering
15 kmr := Replicar::Checkpointing
16 vmr := Replicar::V iewChange
17 emr := Replicar::Execution
18 smr := Replicar::StateTransfer
20 upon input call receive(m ∈Message) do
21 // dispatch message according to message type
22 output (cmr|omr|kmr|vmr|emr|smr).receive(m)
24 upon internal call hasV alidCertificate(m = 〈 . . .〉σx)→ Bool do
25 p := m.certificate().proof()
26 return input sigprovc.verifySignature(〈Signature, pubkeysr(x), p〉,m)
28 upon internal call hasV alidCertificate(m = 〈 . . .〉τ(r′,tc,tv′,tv))→ Bool do
29 p := m.certificate().proof()
30 return input tssr.verifyCertificate(〈TCtr, tssinstsr(r′), tc, tv′, tv, p〉,m)
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4.5 Invocation Protocol
4.5.1 Client Side
Listing 14: Specification of the client role of the invocation protocol.
1 module InvocationHandlerc::Invocation
3 upon internal call leader(v ∈ vN)→ R do
4 return rv mod n
6 upon init() do
7 vc ∈ vN := 0
8 invnoc ∈ iN := 0
9 reqc ∈Message ∪ {∅} := ∅
10 repsc ∈ P(Message) := {}
11 rq_timeoutc := AdaptiveT imeout(R)
12 retransc ∈ Bool := False
14 upon input call startInvocation(svccmd ∈ O)
15 asserts
16 reqc = ∅
17 do
18 invnoc := invnoc + 1
19 reqc := 〈Request, c, invnoc, svccmd〉σc
20 sigprovc.createSignature(reqc)
21 output repconnsc(leader(vc)).send(reqc)
22 rq_timeoutc.start(leader(vc))
24 upon internal task retransmit()
25 with
26 reqc 6= ∅ ∧ ¬retransc ∧ rq_timeoutc.isExpired()
27 do
28 rq_timeoutc.adapt()
29 output repgrpconnc.send(reqc)
30 retransc := True
32 upon global call isCorrectReply(rp, r ∈ R, v ∈ vN, c′ ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svcret ∈ O′) do
33 return rp = 〈Reply, r, v, c′, invno, svcret〉σr ∧ hasV alidCertificate(rp)
35 upon input call receive(rp′ = 〈Reply, r, v′, ·, ·, svcret′〉...) do
36 if reqc 6= ∅ ∧ isCorrectReply(rp′, ·, ·, c, invnoc, ·) then
37 if @v @svcret : rp = 〈Reply, r, v, c, invnoc, svcret〉... ∈ repsc then
38 repsc := repsc ∪ {rp′}
39 else if svcret′ 6= svcret then
40 // r is faulty
41 else if v′ > v then
42 repsc := repsc ∪ {rp′} \ {rp}
44 upon global call isCorrectReplyCertificate(Y ⊆Message, c′ ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svcret ∈ O′ do
45 return |Y | > f
46 ∧ (∀rp ∈ Y ∃r ∈ R : isCorrectReply(rp, r, ·, c′, invno, svcret)
47 ∧ (∀rp′ ∈ Y : rp′ = 〈Reply, r, . . .〉... → rp′ = rp))
49 upon output task invocationCompleted(svcret ∈ O′)
50 with
51 ∃Y ⊆ repsc : isCorrectReplyCertificate(Y, c, invnoc, svcret)
52 do
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53 rq_timeoutc.stop()
54 output repconnsc(leader(vc)).remove(reqc)
55 if retransc then
56 output repgrpconnc.remove(reqc)
57 vc := max({v | 〈Reply, ·, v, . . .〉... ∈ Y })
58 reqc := ∅
59 repsc := {}
60 retransc := False
4.5.2 Replica Side
Listing 15: Specification of the replica role of the invocation protocol.
1 module Replicar::Client
3 def global ReturnEntry def≡ iN× (O′ ∪ {∅})
5 upon global call invocationNumber(〈invno, svcret〉 ∈ ReturnEntry)→ iN do
6 return invno
8 upon init() do
9 cstatusr := V iewStatus(r)
10 reqsr ∈ P(Message) := {}
11 rq_timeoutsr : C → AdaptiveT imeout
12 last_retvalsr : C → ReturnEntry
13 cliconnsr : C → Connection
14 for all c ∈ C do
15 rq_timeoutsr(c) := AdaptiveT imeout(R)
16 last_retvalsr(c) := 〈0,∅〉
17 cliconnsr(c) := Connection({c})
18 contactr := cstatusr.latestLeader()
20 upon global call isCorrectRequest(rq, c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svccmd ∈ O) do
21 return rq = 〈Request, c, invno, svccmd〉σc ∧ hasV alidCertificate(rq)
23 upon input call receive(rq′ = 〈Request, c, invno′, svccmd〉...) do
24 if isRelevantRequest(rq′) ∧ isCorrectRequest(rq′, . . . ) then
25 storeRequest(rq′)
26 if cstatusr.isStableFollower() then
27 forwardRequest(rq′)
28 startRequestT imeout(c)
30 upon internal call isRelevantRequest(rq′ = 〈Request, c, invno′, ·〉...) do
31 return ¬isRequestExecuted(rq′) ∧ (@rq ∈ reqsr ∃invno ≥ invno′ : rq = 〈Request, c, invno, ·〉...)
33 upon internal call storeRequest(rq′ = 〈Request, c, . . .〉...) do
34 reqsr := reqsr \ {rq ∈ reqsr | rq = 〈Request, c, . . .〉...}
35 reqsr := reqsr ∪ {rq′}
37 upon internal call forwardRequest(rq = 〈Request, c, ·〉...) do
38 output repconnsr(contactr).remove({m | m = 〈Request, c, . . .〉...})
39 output repconnsr(contactr).send(rq)
41 upon output call pendingRequests()→ P(Message) do
42 return reqsr
44 upon input call requestExecuted(rq′ = 〈Request, c, invno′, svccmd〉..., svcret ∈ O′) do
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45 reqsr := reqsr \ {rq | rq = 〈Request, c, invno, ·〉... ∧ invno ≤ invno′}
46 last_retvalsr(c) := 〈invno′, svcret〉
47 sendReply(c, invno′, svcret)
48 if @〈Request, c, . . .〉... ∈ reqsr ∧ rq_timeoutsr(c).isRunning() then
49 rq_timeoutsr(c).stop()
51 upon output call isRequestExecuted(rq = 〈Request, c, invno, ·〉...) do
52 return invno ≤ invocationNumber(last_retvalsr(c))
54 upon internal call sendReply(c ∈ C, invno ∈ iN, svcret ∈ O′) do
55 rp := 〈Reply, r, cstatusr.stableV iew(), c, invno, svcret〉σr
56 sigprovr.createSignature(rp)
57 output cliconnsr(c).remove({m | m = 〈Reply, r, ·, c, . . .〉...})
58 output cliconnsr(c).send(rp)
60 upon output call createReturnV alueMapSnapshot()→ (C → ReturnEntry) do
61 return last_retvalsr
63 upon input call installReturnV alueMap(retvals ∈ C → ReturnEntry) do
64 last_retvalsr := retvals
65 for all rq = 〈Request, c, . . .〉... ∈ reqsr do
66 if isRequestExecuted(rq) then
67 reqsr := reqsr \ {rq}
68 if rq_timeoutsr(c).isRunning() then
69 rq_timeoutsr(c).stop()
71 upon internal call startRequestT imeout(c ∈ C) do
72 if rq_timeoutsr(c).isRunning() then
73 rq_timeoutsr(c).stop()
74 rq_timeoutsr(c).start(contactr)
76 upon output call suspectsLeader() do
77 return ∃to ∈ rq_timeoutsr : to.isExpired()
79 upon input call leaveV iewFor(v′ ∈ vN) do
80 cstatus.leaveV iewFor(v′)
82 upon input call enterV iew(v′ ∈ vN) do
83 cstatus.enterV iew(v′)
84 if cstatus.isInStableV iew then
85 output repconnsr(contactr).remove({rq | rq = 〈Request, . . .〉...})
86 contactr := cstatus.latestLeader()
87 for all rq = 〈Request, c, . . .〉... ∈ reqsr do
88 if cstatus.isStableFollower() then
89 forwardRequest(rq)
90 startRequestT imeout(c)
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4.6 Ordering Protocol
Listing 16: Specification of the ordering protocol.
1 module Replicar::Ordering
3 uses vmr ∈ Replicar::V iewChange
4 uses cmr ∈ Replicar::Client
5 uses emr ∈ Replicar::Execution
7 // An abort state comprises a prepared set P and
8 // the value of the trusted counter O at the time of the abort.
9 def global AbortState def≡ (P ∈ P(Message))× N
11 let order_wnd ∈ N1
13 upon global call orderWindowSize() do
14 return order_wnd
16 upon init() do
17 ostatusr := V iewStatus(r)
18 omsgsr ∈ P(Message) = {}
19 o_actr ∈ oN := 0
20 o_baser ∈ oN := 0
21 o_commr ∈ oN := o_baser
22 o_prepr ∈ oN := o_commr
23 o_maxr
def≡ o_baser + order_wnd
25 upon internal task proposalReady(rq = 〈Request, c, invno, svccmd〉σc)
26 with
27 o′ = o_prepr + 1
28 ostatusr.isStableLeader() ∧ o′ ≤ o_maxr
29 v = ostatusr.stableV iew()
30 rq ∈ input cmr.pendingRequests() ∧ (@o : 〈Prepare, r, v, o, rq〉... ∈ omsgsr)
31 do
32 sendPrepare(v, o′, rq)
33 o_prepr := o′
34 o_actr := o′
36 upon internal call sendPrepare(v ∈ vN, o ∈ oN, rq ∈Message) do
37 pr := 〈Prepare, r, v, o, rq〉τ(r,O,v|o,−)
38 invoke tssr.createIndependentCertficate(O, v|o, pr)
39 omsgsr := omsgsr ∪ {pr}
40 output repgrpconnr.send(pr)
42 upon global call isCorrectPrepare(pr, l ∈ R, v ∈ vN, o ∈ oN, rq ∈Message) do
43 return l = leader(v) ∧ pr = 〈Prepare, l, v, o, rq〉τ(l,O,v|o,−) ∧ hasV alidCertificate(pr)
∧ isCorrectRequest(rq, . . . )
45 upon input call receive(pr = 〈Prepare, l, v, o, rq〉...) do
46 if l 6= r ∧ v = ostatusr.stableV iew() ∧ inOrderWindow(o)
∧ isCorrectPrepare(pr, . . . ) then
47 omsgsr := omsgsr ∪ {pr}
49 upon internal task nextPrepared(pr = 〈Prepare, l, v, o′, rq〉...)
50 with
51 ostatusr.isStableFollower()
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52 pr ∈ omsgsr ∧ o′ = o_prepr + 1
53 do
54 o_prepr := o′
55 sendCommit(v, o′, digest(rq))
56 o_actr := o′
58 upon internal call sendCommit(v ∈ vN, o ∈ oN, d ∈ 〈Digest . . .〉) do
59 co := 〈Commit, r, v, o, d〉τ(r,O,v|o,−)
60 invoke tssr.createIndependentCertficate(O, v|o, co)
61 omsgsr := omsgsr ∪ {co}
62 output repgrpconnr.send(co)
64 upon global call isCorrectCommit(co, r′ ∈ R, v ∈ vN, o ∈ oN, d ∈ 〈Digest . . .〉) do
65 return r′ 6= leader(v) ∧ co = 〈Commit, r′, v, o, d〉τ(r′,O,v|o,−) ∧ hasV alidCertificate(co)
67 upon input call receive(co = 〈Commit, r′, v, o, d〉...) do
68 if r′ 6= r ∧ v = ostatusr.stableV iew() ∧ ¬isCommitted(o) ∧ inOrderWindow(o)
∧ isCorrectCommit(co, . . . ) then
69 omsgsr := omsgsr ∪ {co}
71 upon global call isCorrectCommittedCertificate(O ⊆Message, v ∈ vN, o ∈ oN, rq ∈Message) do
72 return |O| ≥ q ∧ (∃pr ∈ O : isCorrectPrepare(pr, ·, v, o, rq)
∧ (∀m ∈ O : m = pr ∨ isCorrectCommit(m, ·, v, o, digest(rq)))
74 upon internal task nextCommitted(rq = 〈Request, c, t, svccmd〉...)
75 with
76 o′ = o_commr + 1
77 ∃O ⊆ omsgsr : isCorrectCommittedCertificate(O, ·, o′, rq)
78 do
79 markCommitted(o′)
80 output emr.executeRequest(o′, rq)
82 upon input call forwardOrderWindow(o′ ∈ oN)
83 asserts
84 o′ > o_baser
85 do
86 o_baser := o′
87 discardOrderMessages()
88 if ¬isCommitted(o′) then
89 markCommitted(o′)
91 upon internal call discardOrderMessages() do
92 omsgsr := {m ∈ omsgsr | inOrderWindow(orderNumber(m))}
93 output repgrpconnr.remove({m | (m = 〈Prepare, . . .〉... ∨m = 〈Commit, . . .〉...) ∧m /∈ omsgsr)})
95 upon internal call markCommitted(o ∈ oN)
96 asserts
97 o > o_commr
98 do
99 if o > o_prepr then
100 o_prepr := o
101 o_commr := o
103 upon output call isCommitted(o ∈ oN) do
104 return o ≤ o_commr
106 upon output call lastCommitted() do
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107 return o_commr
109 upon output call inOrderWindow(o ∈ oN) do
110 return o_baser < o ≤ o_maxr
112 upon output call orderWindowBase()
113 return o_baser
115 upon output call obtainOrderingState(o_base ∈ oN) do
116 return {m ∈ omsgsr | orderNumber(m) > o_base}
118 upon global call isCorrectOrderingState(I ⊆Message, v ∈ vN, o_base ∈ oN) do
119 return ∀m ∈ I ∃o : (isCorrectPrepare(m, ·, v, o, ·) ∨ isCorrectCommit(m, ·, v, o, ·))
∧ o_base < o ≤ o_base+ order_wnd
121 upon input call installOrderingState(I ⊆Message)
122 asserts
123 isCorrectOrderingState(I, ·, ostatusr.stableV iew())
124 do
125 omsgsr := omsgsr ∪ {m ∈ I | inOrderWindow(orderNumber(m))}
127 upon output call createAbortState()→ AbortState do
128 P := {〈Prepare, ·, ·, o, ·〉... ∈ omsgsr |o− 1 = o_baser ∨ 〈Prepare, ·, ·, o− 1, ·〉... ∈ omsgsr}
129 return 〈P, ostatusr.currentV iew() | o_actr〉
131 upon input call abortV iew(v′ ∈ vN,m ∈ 〈 . . . 〉τ(...)) do
132 invoke tssr.createConsecutiveCertficate(O, v′|0,m)
133 o_actr := 0
134 ostatusr.leaveV iewFor(v′)
136 upon global call isCorrectAbortState(
b = 〈P, tv_last〉 ∈ AbortState, v ∈ vN, v′ ∈ vN, o_base ∈ oN,m ∈ 〈 . . .〉τ(r′,O,v′|0,tv_last)) do
137 return hasV alidCertificate(m) ∧ isCorrectAbortState(b, v, v′, o_base)
139 upon global call isCorrectAbortState(〈P, tv_last〉 ∈ AbortState, v ∈ vN, v′ ∈ vN, o_base ∈ oN) do
140 return tv_last = 〈v, o_ctr〉
141 ∧ (∃o_max : isCorrectPrepareSet(P, v, o_base, o_max) ∧ o_max ≥ o_ctr)
143 upon global call isCorrectPrepareSet(P, v ∈ vN, o_base ∈ oN, o_max ∈ oN) do
144 return |P | = 0 ∧ o_max = o_base ∨ 0 < |P | ≤ order_wnd
145 ∧ o_base = minOrderNumber(P )− 1 ∧ o_max = maxOrderNumber(P )
146 ∧ (∀pr ∈ P ∃o : isCorrectPrepare(pr, v, o, ·))
147 ∧ (∀o′ ∈ oN : o_base < o′ ≤ o_max→ 〈Prepare, ·, ·, o′·〉... ∈ P )
149 upon input call abortV iew(v′ ∈ vN) do
150 invoke tssr.forwardCounter(O, v′|0)
151 o_actr := 0
152 ostatusr.leaveV iewFor(v′)
154 upon input call installAbortState(b = 〈P, tv_last〉 ∈ AbortState)
155 asserts
156 isCorrectAbortState(b, ostatusr.stableV iew(), . . . )
157 do
158 installOrderingState(P )
160 upon output call createV iewTransition(v′ ∈ vN, B ⊆ AbortState) do
161 P ∗ := {pr | 〈P, ·〉 ∈ B ∧ pr ∈ P}
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162 if |P ∗| = 0 then
163 return ∅
164 else
165 o_max := maxOrderNumber(P ∗)
166 P ′ := {〈Prepare, r, v′, o,m〉τ(r,O,v|o,−) |o > o_baser ∧ 〈Prepare, ·, ·, o,m〉... ∈ P ∗}
167 for o : o_baser < o ≤ o_max do
168 pr′ := 〈Prepare, r, v′, o,m〉... | pr′ ∈ P ′
169 invoke tssr.createIndependentCertficate(O, v′|o, pr′)
170 return P ′
172 upon global call isCorrectV iewTransition(P ′, v′ ∈ vN, o_base ∈ oN, B ⊆ AbortState) do
173 P ∗ := {pr | 〈P, ·〉 ∈ B ∧ pr ∈ P}
174 return isCorrectPrepareSet(P ′, v′, o_base, ·)
175 ∧ (∀pr ∈ P ∗ : pr = 〈Prepare, ·, ·, o,m〉...∧ (o > o_base→ 〈Prepare, ·, v, o,m〉... ∈ P ′))
176 ∧ (∀pr′ ∈ P ′ : pr′ = 〈Prepare, ·, ·, o,m〉...∧ 〈Prepare, ·, ·, o,m〉... ∈ P ∗)
178 upon input call enterV iew(v′ ∈ vN, P ′ ⊆Message) do
179 ostatusr.enterV iew(v′)
180 if |P ′| = 0 ∨ r 6= ostatusr.lastestLeader() then
181 o_prepr := o_baser
182 else
183 o_max := maxOrderNumber(P )
184 o_prepr := o_max
185 o_actr := o_max
186 o_commr := o_baser
187 output repgrpconnr.remove({m | m = 〈Prepare, . . .〉... ∨m = 〈Commit, . . .〉...})
188 installOrderingState(P ′)
190 upon internal call orderNumber(m ∈Message)
191 asserts
192 m = (〈Prepare, ·, ·, o, ·〉... ∨ 〈Commit, ·, ·, o, ·〉...)
193 do
194 return o
196 upon internal call maxOrderNumber(I ⊆Message)
197 return max({o | m ∈ I ∧ o = orderNumber(m)})
199 upon internal call minOrderNumber(I ⊆Message)
200 return min({o | m ∈ I ∧ o = orderNumber(m)})
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4.7 Execution
Listing 17: Specification of the service execution.
1 module Replicar::Execution
3 uses cmr ∈ Replicar::Client
4 uses kmr ∈ Replicar::Checkpointing
6 def global ServiceSnapshot def≡ S × (C → ReturnEntry)
8 upon init() do
9 svcr := Service()
10 o_execr ∈ oN := 0
12 upon input call executeRequest(o ∈ oN, rq = 〈Request, c, t, svccmd〉...)
13 asserts
14 o = o_execr + 1
15 do
16 if ¬cmr.isRequestExecuted(rq) then
17 svcret := invoke svcr.invoke(c, svccmd)
18 output cmr.requestExecuted(rq, svcret)
19 o_execr := o
20 output kmr.stateReached(o)
22 upon output call createSnapshot() do
23 s := input svcr.createStateSnapshot()
24 retvals := input cmr.createReturnV alueMapSnapshot()
25 return 〈s, retvals〉
27 upon input call installSnapshot(o_exec ∈ oN, 〈s, retvals〉 ∈ ServiceSnapshot) do
28 invoke svcr.installStateSnapshot(s)
29 invoke cmr.installReturnV alueMap(retvals)
30 o_execr := o_exec
31
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4.8 Checkpointing Protocol
Listing 18: Specification of the checkpointing protocol.
1 module Replicar::Checkpointing
3 uses omr ∈ Replicar::Ordering
4 uses emr ∈ Replicar::Execution
6 def global
7 CheckpointState def≡ oN× ServiceSnapshot
8 CheckpointSet def≡ {X|∃o ∀ck ∈ X : ck = 〈Checkpoint, ·, o′, ·〉... ∧ o = o′}
9 ProvenCheckpoint def≡ CheckpointSet× ServiceSnapshot
11 let
12 chkpt_int ∈ N1, chkpt_int ≤ orderWindowSize()
13 retent_wnd ∈ N, retent_wnd < orderWindowSize()
15 upon global call checkpointBase(o)
16 return if o < retent_wnd then 0 else o− retent_wnd
18 upon global call checkpointNumber(〈o, s∗〉 ∈ CheckpointState) do
19 return o
21 upon global call checkpointState(〈o, s∗〉 ∈ CheckpointState) do
22 return s∗
24 upon global call checkpointNumber(K ∈ CheckpointSet)
25 asserts
26 ∃o ∀〈Checkpoint, ·, o′, ·〉... ∈ K : o = o′
27 do
28 return o
30 upon init() do
31 kmsgsr ⊆Message := {}
32 chkptsr ⊆ CheckpointState := {}
33 o_stabr ∈ oN := 0
35 upon input call stateReached(o ∈ oN) do
36 if (o mod chkpt_int) = 0 then
37 createCheckpoint(o)
39 upon internal call createCheckpoint(o ∈ oN) do
40 ks := 〈o, emr.createSnapshot()〉
41 chkptsr := chkptsr ∪ {ks}
42 sendCheckpoint(ks)
44 upon internal call sendCheckpoint(〈o, s∗〉 ∈ CheckpointState)
45 ck := 〈Checkpoint, r, o, digest(s∗)〉τ(r,M,0,0)
46 invoke tssr.createConsecutiveCertificate(M, 0, ck)
47 kmsgsr := kmsgsr ∪ {ck}
48 output repgrpconnr.send(ck)
50 upon global call isCorrectCheckpoint(ck, r′ ∈ R, o ∈ oN, d ∈ 〈Digest . . .〉) do
51 return ck = 〈Checkpoint, r′, o, d〉τ(r′,M,0,0) ∧ hasV alidCertificate(ck)
53 upon input call receive(ck′ = 〈Checkpoint, r′, o, d〉...) do
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54 if isRelevantCheckpoint(ck′) ∧ isCorrectCheckpoint(ck′, . . . )
∧ (@d′ : 〈Checkpoint, r′, o, d′〉... ∈ kmsgsr ∧ d′ 6= d) then
55 storeCheckpoint(ck′)
57 upon internal call isRelevantCheckpoint(〈Checkpoint, r′, o, ·〉...) do
58 return r′ 6= r ∧ isRelevantCheckpoint(o)
60 upon internal call isRelevantCheckpoint(o ∈ oN) do
61 return o = input omr.orderWindowBase()∨ input omr.inOrderWindow(o)
63 upon internal call storeCheckpoint(ck′ = 〈Checkpoint, r′, o, d〉...) do
64 kmsgsr := kmsgsr \ {ck ∈ kmsgsr | ck = 〈Checkpoint, r′, o, ·〉...}
65 kmsgsr := kmsgsr ∪ {ck′}
67 upon internal call discardCheckpoints() do
68 o_base := input omr.orderWindowBase()
69 kmsgsr := kmsgsr \ {〈Checkpoint, ·, o, ·〉... ∈ kmsgsr | o < o_base}
70 output repgrpconnr.remove({ck | ck = 〈Checkpoint, . . .〉... ∧ ck /∈ kmsgsr})
72 upon global call isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K ⊆Message, o ∈ oN, d ∈ 〈Digest . . .〉) do
73 return o = 0 ∧ |K| = 0 ∨ |K| > f ∧ (∀ck ∈ K : isCorrectCheckpoint(ck, ·, o, d)
75 upon internal task checkpointStable(o′ ∈ oN, d ∈ 〈Digest . . .〉)
76 with
77 o′ > o_stabr ∧ (∃s∗ : digest(s∗) = d ∧ 〈o′, s∗〉 ∈ chkptsr)
78 ∃K′ ⊆ kmsgsr : isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K′, o′, d)
79 ∧ (∀K ⊆ kmsgsr ∃o : isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K, o, ·)→ o ≤ o′)
80 do
81 forwardWindow(o′)
83 upon internal call forwardWindow(o′ ∈ oN) do
84 o_stabr := o′
85 chkptsr := chkptsr \ {〈o, ·〉 ∈ chkptsr | o < o′}
86 if checkpointBase(o′) > input omr.orderWindowBase() then
87 invoke omr.forwardOrderWindow(checkpointBase(o′))
88 discardCheckpoints()
90 upon global call isCorrectProvenCheckpoint(pk, o ∈ oN, s∗ ∈ ServiceSnapshot) do
91 return pk = 〈C, s∗〉 ∈ ProvenCheckpoint ∧ isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(C, o, digest(s∗))
93 upon output call stableCheckpointNumber() do
94 return o_stabr
96 upon internal call hasStableCheckpoint() do
97 return o_stabr > 0
99 upon internal call stableCheckpoint()→ ProvenCheckpoint
100 asserts
101 hasStableCheckpoint()
102 do
103 〈o, s∗〉 ∈ chkptsr | o = o_stabr
104 K := {〈Checkpoint, ·, o, digest(s∗)〉... ∈ kmsgsr}
105 return 〈K, s∗〉
107 upon output call stableCheckpointCertificate()→ CheckpointSet do
108 if ¬hasStableCheckpoint() then
109 return ∅
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110 else
111 〈K, ·〉 := stableCheckpoint()
112 return K
114 upon output call obtainCheckpointingState(o_stab ∈ oN, o_comm ∈ oN) do
115 if o_comm < input omr.orderWindowBase() then
116 return stableCheckpoint()
117 else if o_stab < o_stabr then
118 return stableCheckpointCertificate()
119 else
120 return ∅
122 upon global call isCorrectCheckpointingState(ks, o_stab ∈ oN) do
123 return ks = ∅
124 ∨ ks ∈ CheckpointSet ∧ (|ks| = 0 ∨ isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(ks, o_stab, ·))
125 ∨ isCorrectProvenCheckpoint(ks, o_stab, ·)
127 upon input call installCheckpointingState(ks)
128 asserts
129 isCorrectCheckpointingState(ks, . . . )
130 do
131 if ks ∈ CheckpointSet then
132 installCheckpointCertificate(ks)
133 else if ks = 〈K, s∗〉 ∧ ¬ input omr.isCommitted(checkpointNumber(K)) then
134 o := checkpointNumber(K)
135 output emr.installSnapshot(o, s∗)
136 forwardWindow(o)
137 createCheckpoint(o)
138 installCheckpointCertificate(K)
140 upon input call installCheckpointCertificate(K ∈ CheckpointSet)
141 asserts
142 ∃o : isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K, o, ·)
143 do
144 if isRelevantCheckpoint(o) then
145 for all ck ∈ K do
146 if isRelevantCheckpoint(ck) then
147 storeCheckpoint(ck)
148 if o > o_stabr then
149 check checkpointStable()
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4.9 View-Change Protocol
Listing 19: Specification of the view-change protocol.
1 module Replicar::ViewChange
3 uses cmr ∈ Replicar::Client
4 uses omr ∈ Replicar::Ordering
5 uses kmr ∈ Replicar::Checkpointing
6 uses smr ∈ Replicar::StateTransfer
8 upon init() do
9 vstatusr := V iewStatus(r)
10 v_stabr
def≡ vstatusr.stableV iew()
11 v_curr
def≡ vstatusr.currentV iew()
12 vmsgsr ⊆Message := {}
13 nv_timeoutr := AdaptiveT imeout(R \ {r})
15 upon internal call stableV iewCertificate() do
16 asserts
17 v_stabr > 0
18 do
19 return 〈New-View, ·, v_stabr, . . .〉... ∈ vmsgsr
21 upon internal call suspectsAcceptedLeader() do
22 return cmr.suspectsLeader()
24 upon internal call isLeaderSuspectedByQuorum() do
25 return ∃V ⊆ vmsgsr : |V | > f
26 ∧ (∀vc ∈ V ∃v_to : v_to > v_curr ∧ isCorrectV iewChange(vc, ·, ·, v_to))
28 upon internal task acceptedLeaderSuspected()
29 with
30 vstatusr.isInStableV iew()
∧ (suspectsAcceptedLeader() ∨ isLeaderSuspectedByQuorum())
31 do
32 leaveV iewFor(v_curr + 1)
34 upon internal call leaveV iewFor(v′ ∈ vN) do
35 v := v_curr
36 l := leader(v)
37 K := input kmr.stableCheckpointCertificate()
38 b := input omr.createAbortState()
39 vc := 〈View-Change, r, v_stabr, v′,K, b〉...
40 if nv_timeoutr.isRunning() then
41 nv_timeoutr.stop()
42 output omr.abortV iew(v′, vc)
43 vstatusr.leaveV iewFor(v′)
44 storeV iewChange(vc)
45 output repgrpconnr.send(vc)
46 if v = v_stabr then
47 output smr.startStateRequestTask()
49 upon global call isCorrectV iewChange(vc, r′ ∈ R, v_from ∈ vN, v_to ∈ vN) do
50 return ∃K ⊆Message ∃b ∈ AbortState ∃o_base, o_stab ∈ oN :
51 vc = 〈View-Change, r′, v_from, v_to,K, b〉... ∧ v_from < v_to
52 ∧ isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K, o_stab, ·)
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53 ∧ o_base = checkpointBase(o_stab)
54 ∧ isCorrectAbortState(b, v_from, v_to, o_base, vc)
56 upon input call receive(vc′ = 〈View-Change, r′, v_from, v_to,K, b〉...) do
57 if isRelevantV iewChange(vc′) ∧ isCorrectV iewChange(vc′, · · · ) then
58 installV iewChange(vc′)
60 upon internal call isRelevantV iewChange(vc′ = 〈View-Change, r′, v_from, v_to, . . .〉...) do
61 return r′ 6= r ∧ (v_to > v_curr ∨ ¬vstatusr.isInStableV iew ∧ v_to = v_curr)
63 upon internal call storeV iewChange(vc′ = 〈View-Change, ·, ·, v_to′, · · ·〉...) do
64 vmsgsr := vmsgsr ∪ {vc′}
65 discardV iewChanges()
67 upon internal call discardV iewChanges() do
68 if vstatusr.isInStableV iew() then
69 V Cnxt := ∅
70 else
71 V Cnxt := {vc ∈ vmsgsr | vc = 〈View-Change, ·, ·, v_curr, · · ·〉...}
72 V Cmax := {vc_max ∈ vmsgsr | vc_max = 〈View-Change, r′, ·, v_max, · · ·〉...
73 ∧ v_max > v_curr
74 ∧ (∀vc ∈ vmsgsr : vc = 〈View-Change, r′, ·, v, · · ·〉... → v ≤ v_max)}
75 V S := {〈v, V ∗〉 | V ∗ ⊆ vmsgsr ∧ v > v_stabr
76 ∧ isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V ∗, v_stabr, v)
77 ∧ (∀V ⊆ vmsgsr :
78 isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V, v_stabr, v)→ |V | ≤ |V ∗|)}
79 if v_curr ≤ v_stabr + 1 then
80 V cur := ∅
81 else if 〈v_curr, V ∗〉 ∈ V S then
82 V cur := V ∗
83 else
84 V cur := V ∗ | 〈v_curr − 1, V ∗〉 ∈ V S
85 if |V S| = 0 then
86 V max := ∅
87 else
88 V max := V ∗ | 〈v_max, V ∗〉 ∈ V S ∧ (∀〈v, ·〉 ∈ V S : v ≤ v_max)
89 vmsgsr := vmsgsr \ {vc ∈ vmsgsr | vc = 〈View-Change, . . .〉...
90 ∧ vc /∈ (V Cnxt ∪ V Cmax ∪ V cur ∪ V max)}
91 output repgrpconnr.remove({vc | vc = 〈View-Change, . . .〉...
92 ∧ vc /∈ (V Cnxt ∪ V Cmax ∪ V cur ∪ V max)})
94 upon input call installV iewChange(vc′ = 〈View-Change, ·, v_from, v_to,K, b〉...) do
95 storeV iewChange(vc′)
96 abortStateReceived(v_from,K, b)
98 upon internal call abortStateReceived(v ∈ vN,K ∈ CheckpointSet, b ∈ AbortState) do
99 output kmr.installCheckpointCertificate(K)
100 if v = v_stabr then
101 output omr.installAbortStaet(b)
103 upon global call isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V ⊆Message, v_from ∈ vN, v_to ∈ vN) do
104 return |V | ≥ q ∧ (∀vc ∈ V ∃v_from≤ :
v_from≤ ≤ v_from ∧ isCorrectV iewCange(vc, ·, v_from≤, v_to)
106 upon internal call isInOrderWindow(K ⊆Message)
107 return checkpointBase(checkpointNumber(K)) ≤ input omr.orderWindowBase()
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109 upon internal call isInOrderWindow(V ⊆Message,A ⊆Message)
110 return checkpointBase(maxCheckpointNumber(V,A)) ≤ input omr.orderWindowBase()
112 upon internal call maxCheckpointNumber(V ⊆Message,A ⊆Message) do
113 return max({checkpointNumber(K) |
〈View-Change, ·, ·, ·,K, . . .〉... ∈ V ∨ 〈New-View-Ack, ·, ·,K, ·〉...})
115 upon internal task newV iewExpected()
116 with
117 ¬vstatusr.isInStableV iew() ∧ l′ = leader(v_curr) ∧ l′ 6= r
118 ∃V ⊆ vmsgsr : isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V, v_stabr, v_curr)
119 ¬nv_timeoutr.isRunning()
120 do
121 nv_timeoutr.start(l′)
123 upon internal call suspectsDesignatedLeader() do
124 return nv_timeoutr.isExpired()
126 upon internal task designatedLeaderSuspected()
127 with
128 ¬vstatusr.isInStableV iew()∧ (suspectsDesignatedLeader() ∨ isLeaderSuspectedByQuorum())
129 ∃V ⊆ vmsgsr : isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V, v_stabr, v_curr)∧ isInOrderWindow(V, ∅)
130 do
131 installAbortStates(V )
132 leaveV iewFor(v_curr + 1)
134 upon internal task viewMissed(v′ ∈ vN)
135 with
136 ∃V ⊆ vmsgsr ∃v : v′ > v_curr ∧ isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V, v_stabr, v′)
∧ isInOrderWindow(V, ∅)
137 do
138 installAbortStates(V )
139 leaveV iewFor(v′)
141 upon internal call installAbortStates(V ⊆Message)
142 for all vc ∈ V do
143 vc := 〈View-Change, ·, v_from, · · · , b〉...
144 if v_from = v_stabr then
145 output omr.installAbortState(b)
147 upon global call isCorrectNewV iewCertificate(V ⊆Message,A ⊆Message, v_from ∈ vN, v_to ∈ vN)
do
148 return isCorrectV iewChangeCertificate(V, v_from, v_to)
149 ∧ (∀na ∈ A : isCorrectNewV iewAck(na, ·, v_from))
150 ∧ |{r′ | 〈View-Change, r′, v_from, . . .〉... ∈ V ∨ 〈New-View-Ack, r′, . . .〉... ∈ A}| > f
152 upon internal task newLeaderV iewReady()
153 with
154 ∃v′ ≥ v_curr ∃V,A ⊆ vmsgsr : r = leader(v′)
155 ∧ isCorrectNewV iewCertificate(V,A, ·, v′)
156 ∧ isInOrderWindow(V,A)
157 do
158 establishV iew(v′, V, A)
160 upon internal call establishV iew(v′ ∈ vN, V ⊆Message,A ⊆Message) do
161 if v′ > v_curr then
162 output omr.abortV iew(v′)
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163 v_curr := v′
164 K := input kmr.stableCheckpointCertificate()
165 B := allAbortStates(V,A)
166 P ′ := input omr.createV iewTransition(v′, B)
167 nv := 〈New-View, r, v′,K, V,A, P ′〉τ(r,N,v′,−)
168 invoke tssr.createIndependentCertficate(N, v′, nv)
169 storeNewV iew(nv)
170 enterV iew(v′, P ′)
171 output repgrpconnr.send(nv)
173 upon global call isCorrectNewV iew(nv, v ∈ vN,K ⊆Message) do
174 return ∃V,A, P ′, o_stab, o_base :
175 nv = 〈New-View, leader(v), v,K, V, P ′〉τ(l,N,v,−)
176 ∧ hasV alidCertificate(nv)
177 ∧ isCorrectNewV iewCertificate(V,A, ·, v)
178 ∧ isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K, o_stab, ·)
179 ∧ o_stab ≥ maxCheckpointNumber(V,A)
180 ∧ o_base = checkpointBase(o_stab)
181 ∧ isCorrectV iewTransition(P ′, v, o_base, allAbortStates(V,A))
183 upon input call receive(nv′ = 〈New-View, . . .〉...) do
184 if isRelevantNewV iew(nv′) ∧ isCorrectNewV iew(nv′, . . . ) then
185 installNewV iew(nv′)
187 upon internal call isRelevantNewV iew(nv′ = 〈New-View, ·, v′, . . .〉...) do
188 return v′ > latestKnownV iew()
190 upon internal call storeNewV iew(nv′ = 〈New-View, . . .〉...) do
191 vmsgsr := vmsgsr ∪ {nv′}
192 discardNewV iews()
194 upon internal call discardNewV iews() do
195 NV cur := {nv_cur ∈ vmsgsr | nv_cur = 〈New-View, ·, v_cur, . . .〉...
∧ (v_cur = v_stabr ∨ v_cur = latestKnownV iew()}
196 vmsgsr := vmsgsr \ {nv ∈ vmsgsr | nv = 〈New-View, . . .〉... ∧ nv /∈ NV cur}
197 output repgrpconnr.remove({nv | nv = 〈New-View, . . .〉... ∧ nv /∈ NV cur})
199 upon internal call installNewV iew(nv′ = 〈New-View, l, v′,K, V, P ′〉...) do
200 storeNewV iew(nv′)
201 for all vc ∈ V do
202 if isRelevantV iewChange(vc) then
203 installV iewChange(vc)
204 output kmr.installCheckpointCertificate(K)
205 for all 〈View-Change, . . . ,K′, . . .〉... ∈ V
206 output kmr.installCheckpointCertificate(K′)
208 upon internal call allAbortStates(V ⊆Message,A ⊆Message) do
209 return {b | 〈View-Change, . . . , b〉... ∈ V ∨ 〈New-View-Ack, . . . , b〉... ∈ A}
211 upon internal call latestKnownV iew() do
212 return max({v | 〈New-View, ·, v, . . .〉... ∈ vmsgsr} ∪ {0})
214 upon internal task newFollowerV iewReady(nv = 〈New-View, l, v′,K, ·, ·, P ′〉...)
215 with
216 nv ∈ vmsgsr ∧ v′ = latestKnownV iew() ∧ v′ > v_stabr∧ isInOrderWindow(K)
217 do
218 isbelated := v′ < v_curr
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219 if v′ > v_curr then
220 output omr.abortV iew(v′)
221 v_curr := v′
222 enterV iew(v′, P ′)
223 if isbelated then
224 sendNewV iewAck()
226 upon internal call sendNewV iewAck() do
227 K := input kmr.stableCheckpointCertificate()
228 b := input omr.createAbortState(v_curr)
229 na := 〈New-View-Ack, r, v_curr,K, b〉τ(r,M,0,0)
230 invoke tssr.createContinuingCertficate(M, 0, na)
231 storeNewV iewAck(na)
232 output repgrpconnr.send(na)
234 upon global call isCorrectNewV iewAck(na, r′ ∈ R, v ∈ vN) do
235 return ∃K ⊆Message ∃b ∈ AbortState ∃o_base, o_stab ∈ oN :
236 na = 〈New-View-Ack, r′, v,K, b〉τ(r,M,0,0)
237 ∧ hasV alidCertificate(na)
238 ∧ isCorrectCheckpointCertificate(K, o_stab, ·)
239 ∧ o_base = checkpointBase(o_stab)
240 ∧ isCorrectAbortState(b, v_from, v_to, o_base)
242 upon input call receive(na′ = 〈New-View-Ack, . . .〉...) do
243 if isRelevantNewV iewAck(na′) ∧ isCorrectNewV iewAck(na′, · · · ) then
244 installNewV iewAck(na′)
246 upon internal call isRelevantNewV iewAck(na′ = 〈New-View-Ack, r′, v′, . . .〉...) do
247 return v′ ≥ v_stabr ∧ (∀na ∈ vmsgsr : na = 〈New-View-Ack, r′, v, . . .〉... → v′ > v)
249 upon internal call storeNewV iewAck(na′ = 〈New-View-Ack, . . .〉...) do
250 vmsgsr := vmsgsr ∪ {na}
251 discardNewV iewAcks()
253 upon internal call discardNewV iewAcks() do
254 NAmax := {na_max ∈ vmsgsr | na_max = 〈New-View-Ack, r′, v_max, . . .〉...
255 ∧ v_max ≥ v_stabr
256 ∧ (∀na ∈ vmsgsr : na = 〈New-View-Ack, r′, v, . . .〉...)→ v ≤ v_max}
257 vmsgsr := vmsgsr \ {na ∈ vmsgsr | na = 〈New-View-Ack, . . .〉... ∧ na /∈ NAmax}
258 output repgrpconnr.remove({na | na = 〈New-View-Ack, . . .〉... ∧ na /∈ NAmax})
260 upon internal call installNewV iewAck(na′ = 〈New-View-Ack, ·, v′,K, b〉...) do
261 storeNewV iewAck(na′)
262 abortStateReceived(v′,K, b)
264 upon internal call enterV iew(v′ ∈ vN, P ′ ⊆Message) do
265 vstatusr.enterV iew(v′)
266 discardV iewChanges()
267 discardNewV iews()
268 discardNewV iewAcks()
269 if vstatusr.isInStableV iew() then
270 if nv_timeoutr.isRunning() then
271 nv_timeoutr.stop()
272 output smr.stopStateRequestTask()
273 output omr.enterV iew(v′, P ′)
274 output cmr.enterV iew(v′)
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276 upon output call createStateRequestContent() do
277 o_comm := input omr.lastCommitted()
278 o_stab := input kmr.stableCheckpointNumber()
279 return 〈latestKnownV iew(), v_curr, o_stab, o_comm〉
281 upon global call isCorrectStateRequestContent(sr) do
282 return sr = 〈v_latest ∈ vN, v_cur ∈ vN, o_stab ∈ oN, o_comm ∈ oN〉 ∧ o_stab ≤ o_comm
284 upon output call obtainState(〈v_latest, v_cur, o_stab, o_comm〉) do
285 if v_latest > v_stabr ∨ v_stabr 6= latestKnownV iew()
286 return ∅
287 if v_latest < v_stabr then
288 nv := stableV iewCertificate()
289 I := input omr.obtainOrderingState( input omr.orderWindowBase())
290 else
291 nv := ∅
292 I := input omr.obtainOrderingState(o_comm)
293 V := {vc ∈ vmsgsr | vc = 〈View-Change, . . . , v_to, ·〉...
∧ (v_to > v_latest ≥ v_cur ∨ v_to ≥ v_cur > v_latest)}
294 A := {na ∈ vmsgsr | na = 〈New-View-Ack, ·, v, . . .〉... ∧ v ≥ v_latest}
295 ks := input kmr.obtainCheckpointingState(o_stab, o_comm),
296 return if nv 6= ∅ ∨ |V | > 0 ∨ |A| > 0 ∨ ks 6= ∅ ∨ |I| > 0
297 then 〈v_stabr, nv, V,A, ks, I〉 else ∅
299 upon global call isCorrectState(state)
300 return state = 〈v, nv, V,A, ks, I〉 ∧ (∃K′, o_base, o_stab :
301 ∧ (nv = ∅ ∨ isCorrectNewV iew(nv, v,K′, . . . ) ∧ o_stab ≥ checkpointNumber(K′))
302 ∧ (∀vc ∈ V ∃v_to : isCorrectV iewChange(vc, ·, ·, v_to) ∧ v_to > v)
303 ∧ (∀na ∈ A ∃v′ : isCorrectNewV iewAck(na, ·, v′) ∧ v′ ≥ v)
304 ∧ o_base = checkpointBase(o_stab)
305 ∧ isCorrectCheckpointingState(ks, o_stab)
306 ∧ isCorrectOrderingState(I, v, o_base))
308 upon input call installState(〈v, nv, V,A, ks, I〉)
309 output kmr.installCheckpointingState(ks)
310 if isRelevantNewV iew(nv) then
311 installNewV iew(nv)
312 check newFollowerV iewReady()
313 if v = v_stabr then
314 output omr.installOrderingState(I)
315 for all vc ∈ V do
316 if isRelevantV iewChange(vc) then
317 installV iewChange(vc)
318 for all na ∈ A do
319 if isRelevantNewV iewAck(na) then
320 installNewV iewAck(na)
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4.10 State Transfer Protocol
Listing 20: Specification of the state-transfer protocol.
1 module Replicar::StateTransfer
3 uses vmr ∈ Replicar::V iewChange
5 let state_periodr ∈ N
7 upon init() do
8 state_timerr := T imer()
10 upon input call startStateRequestTask() do
11 output state_timerr.schedule(state_periodr)
13 upon input call stopStateRequestTask() do
14 output state_timerr.cancel()
16 upon internal task periodicallyRequestState()
17 with
18 input state_timerr.isExpired()
19 do
20 requestState()
21 state_timerr.schedule(state_periodr)
23 upon input call requestState() do
24 src := input vmr.createStateRequestContent()
25 sr := 〈State-Request, r, src〉τ(r,M,0,0)
26 invoke tssr.createConsecutiveCertficate(M, 0, sr)
27 output repgrpconnr.remove({m | m = 〈State-Request, . . .〉...})
28 output repgrpconnr.send(sr)
30 upon global call isCorrectStateRequest(sr, r′ ∈ R, src) do
31 return sr = 〈State-Request, r′, src〉τ(r′,M,0,0)
∧ hasV alidCertificate(sr) ∧ isCorrectStateRequestContent(src)
33 upon input call receive(rs = 〈State-Request, r′, src〉...) do
34 if isCorrectStateRequest(rs, r′, src) then
35 state := input vmr.obtainState(src)
36 if state 6= ∅
37 sendState(r′, state)
39 upon internal call sendState(r′ ∈ R, state) do
40 sm := 〈State, r, state〉τ(r,M,0,0)
41 invoke tssr.createConsecutiveCertficate(M, 0, sm)
42 output repconnsr(r′).remove({m | m = 〈State, . . .〉...})
43 output repconnsr(r′).send(sm)
45 upon global call isCorrectStateMessage(sm, r′ ∈ R, state) do
46 return sm = 〈State, r′, state〉τ(r′,M,0,0) ∧ hasV alidCertificate(sm)
47 ∧ isCorrectState(state)
49 upon input call receive(sm = 〈State, r′, state〉...) do
50 if isCorrectStateMessage(sm, r′, state) then
51 output vmr.installState(state)
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